Previous studies on mobile ad fraud detection are limited to detecting certain types of ad fraud (e.g., placement fraud and click fraud). Dynamic interactive ad fraud has never been explored by previous work. In this paper, we propose an explorative study of ad fraud in Android apps. We first created a taxonomy of existing mobile ad fraud. Besides static placement fraud, we also created a new category called dynamic interactive fraud and found three new types of them. Then we propose FrauDroid, a new approach to detect ad fraud based on user interface (UI) state transition graph and networking traffic. To achieve accuracy and scalability, we use an optimized exploration strategy to traverse the UI states that contain ad views, and design a set of heuristic rules to identify kinds of ad fraud. Experiment results show that FrauDroid could achieve a precision of 80.9% and it is capable of detecting all the 7 types of mobile ad fraud. We then apply FrauDroid to more than 80,000 apps from 21 app markets to study the prevalene of ad fraud. We find that 0.29% of apps that use ad libraries are identified containing frauds, with 23 ad networks suffering from ad fraud. Our finding also suggests that Dynamic interactive fraud is more prevalent than static placement fraud in real world apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile advertising is the main way to earn profit for most app publishers. Advertisement libraries are used in almost two-thirds of the popular apps from Google Play [1] . Mobile advertising has become the most important support for the Android ecosystem [2] .
App developers get revenue from advertisers based on the number of advertisements (ads for short) displayed (called impressions) [3] or clicked by users (called clicks). However, current mobile advertising is plagued by various types of frauds [4] [5] . Malicious developers could cheat advertisers and users using fake or unintentional ad impressions/clicks. For example, mobile publishers could typically employ individuals or use bot networks to drive fake impressions and clicks to earn profit [6] . It is estimated that mobile advertisers lose up to 1.3 billion US dollars due to ad fraud in 2015 [7] . Ad fraud in mobile advertising has become the next battleground for advertisers and researchers.
Ad fraud in web advertising has been extensively studied. Most of them focus on click fraud (also known as botdriven fraud), which uses individuals or bot networks to drive fake or undesirable impressions and clicks. These studies include detecting click fraud based on networking traffic [8] [9] or searching engine query logs [10] , characterizing click fraud [11] [12] [13] and analyzing its profit model [14] .
Very few studies exist in exploring ad fraud in mobile apps. One relevant work DECAF [4] was proposed to detect placement frauds that manipulate visual layouts of ad views (also called elements or controls) to trigger undesirable impressions in Windows Phone Apps. They explored the UI states (referring to the running pages of the apps) to detect ad placement frauds, e.g., hidden ads, many ads in one page, etc. MAdFraud [6] was proposed to detect click frauds in Android apps by analyzing networking traffic.
However, with the evolution of ad fraud, the deception techniques used by mobile publishers are getting more and more sophisticated, especially when the characteristics of mobile apps are considered. Besides placement fraud and click fraud mentioned earlier, many apps use sophisticated ways to entice user to click the ad view during user's interaction with the app, which are however not expected by the user. We call them dynamic interactive fraud. Figure 1 shows an motivating example. The app (com.android.yatree.taijiaomusic) pops up an ad view upon the exit button unexpectedly when user wants to exit the app, which could cause an undesirable click. Actually, this app misleads 9 of 10 users to click the ad view in our study.
Along with previous studies, we divide mobile ad frauds into two categories: 1) static placement fraud. The fraud occurs in a single UI state and the behavior could be determined by static information, such as the ad view size, location, and the number of ad views, etc. 2) dynamic interactive fraud. The fraud involves multiple UI states and the fraud occurs during user's interaction with the app at runtime. In this paper, we propose an explorative study of ad fraud in Android apps. We first created a taxonomy of existing mobile ad fraud. Besides static placement fraud (hidden fraud, size fraud, number fraud, overlap fraud), we also created a new category called dynamic interactive fraud that has never been explored in previous work. These frauds relate to how the apps mislead users to trigger ad impressions during user's interaction with the app at runtime. We have identified three new types of dynamic interactive frauds, including Explicit UI Transition Fraud that intentionally pops up an ad view during users' interaction with the app to get accidental clicks, Implicit UI Transition fraud that downloads apps or files without users' interaction after ad is clicked, and Pop-up Window Fraud that pops up an ad view outside of the app environment. Note that click fraud on Android has been well studied in previous work [6] [15] , this kind of fraud is not in the scope of this taxonomy. Because click fraud is mainly about fake impressions/clicks, while in this paper we mainly focus on the frauds that entice users to click. So the state-of-the-art has just explored the straightforward frauds (e.g., placement, click), while in this work we go one step further to tackle the more challenging ones, that is, to pinpoint such frauds that entice users to click.
Unlike static placement fraud detection that only needs to analyze the visual layout of ads in a single state [4] , we face several new challenges to detect these kinds of new ad fraud: 1) UI state transition. A UI state is a running page that contains many visual views (also called elements) which refer to controls in Android. To detect dynamic interactive fraud, we should consider not only the current UI state, but also the relationship between UI states and even analyze the background networking traffic. To detect ad fraud in the motivating example ( Figure 1 ), we should analyze both current UI state and the next UI state to check whether there is an ad view placed upon the button that will entice users to click unexpectedly. One challenge in here is how to trigger ad views and how to achieve scalability and state coverage in UI state traversing? Previous work suggested that it takes several hours to traverse all the states of an app based on Android automation framework [16] .
2) Ad view detection. Different from the Windows Phone platform that previous work [4] focused on, it is hard to identify an ad view from a given UI state, because no labels are provided to distinguish it from other views. During app development, views can be added into the activity by either specifying it in the xml layout or embedding it in the source code. Most ad views are embedded in the code, which makes it not feasible to identify ad views based on the xml layout. How to distinguish the ad view from a large number of normal views in a given app state? 3) Detecting multiple kinds of ad fraud. We should explore the characteristic of different ad frauds, and the Fraud Checker we designed should capture enough features to identify different ad fraud behaviors, especially for the ones that have never been studied by previous work.
What kinds of features should we collect and how do we collect them?
To address these challenges, we propose FrauDroid, a new approach to detect ad frauds based on UI transition graphs and networking traffic. We introduce two key techniques to achieve accuracy and scalability in ad fraud detection.
1)
We propose an automation technique to traverse the UI states that contain ad views in Android apps. To capture the relationship between UI states, we simulate user interactive events, build the UI transition graph and monitor networking traffic at runtime. To distinguish the ad view from a large number of normal views in a given app state, we collected a large amount of ad views and normal views, compared them from various aspects (e.g., placement features, string features, etc.) and trained a detector to identify ad views. To achieve scalability in UI state traversing, we optimize the UI exploration strategy based on the findings that more than 80% of the UI states do not contain ad views, and ad views usually appear at the start and end of a UI state. 2) We design a set of heuristic rules based on the characteristic of different ad frauds. We capture various behaviors (e.g., size, bounds, string, networking traffic, etc.) of ad view at runtime to check against these rules. For the motivating example (Figure 1 ), the Fraud Checker first identifies the state that contains ad view, then it traverses the state transition graph. If an ad view click event or an ad close button click event is found, and the next state is an interactive view such as an exit dialog, it will label the previous state as interactive fraud.
We have implemented a prototype system to detect ad fraud in Android apps. Experiments show that FrauDroid could achieve a precision of 80.9% and it is capable of detecting all the 7 types of Android ad frauds. We have applied FrauDroid to a large dataset containing 80,539 apps crawled from 21 app markets including Google Play and other major third-party markets. Based on extensive experiments on smartphones, we have identified 92 ad fraud apps, roughly accounted for 0.3% of the apps that use ad libraries in our study. For some app markets such as PP Assistant 1 , more than 2.65% of the apps that use ad libraries are detected containing ad frauds. We also find 5 ad fraud apps from Google Play, which demonstrates that mobile ad fraud is prevalent in app markets.
We make the following main research contributions: 1) We create a taxonomy of existing mobile ad frauds. Besides placement fraud (hidden fraud, size fraud, number fraud, overlap fraud), we also identified a new category called dynamic interactive fraud (explicit UI transition fraud, implicit UI transition fraud, pop-up window fraud) that has never been explored by previous studies. 2) We propose FrauDroid, a new approach to detect mobile ad fraud based on UI transition graph and networking traffic. To the best of our knowledge, FrauDroid is the first work that could detect all the 7 kinds of ad fraud in Android apps. 3) We have applied FrauDroid to 80,000 apps from 21 app markets. Experiment results show that FrauDroid is able to detect ad fraud with acceptable accuracy and scalability. We found 92 ad fraud apps, even some of them are popular apps that have millions of downloads.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Mobile Advertising
We first give a brief introduction to the mobile advertising ecosystem. There are four key roles involved in the advertising ecosystem: advertiser, advertising network, app publisher and mobile user. Advertiser is a role who advertises on the advertising network and pays for it. Advertising network (ad network) is a trusted intermediary platform which connects advertiser and app publisher. App publisher (also called developer) is the one who releases apps to the app markets. Mobile user downloads apps from the app markets and uses it on smartphones. Figure 2 shows the workflow of mobile advertising ecosystem. In mobile platform, most ads are embedded in the apps in the form of ad library that could fetch and display ads at runtime. Advertisers put an ad on the ad network, then app publishers get and embed ad library from ad network. Users download the app and run it on smartphone. The ad library fetches ad content and sends feedback (impressions and clicks) to the ad network after the app gets started. Advertisers pay ad networks and app publishers based on impression count or click count.
However, ad fraud is threatening the mobile advertising ecosystem. Some ad networks are aware of the threat of ad fraud and have published policies and guidelines (called prohibitions) on how ad views should be placed or used in app. For example, Google Admob publishes admob program policies that all app publishers are required to follow it [17] . All violations of the policies are regarded as ad frauds. Despite these prohibitions, mobile app publishers have incentive to commit such frauds. Ad fraud endangers all the mobile advertising ecosystem. This behavior cheats mobile advertiser, reduces the credibility of ad network, and even greatly degrades user experience.
B. Mobile Ad Fraud
Ad fraud in web advertising has been extensively studied but there is very little research on mobile ad fraud.
Previous studies mainly focus on two categories of mobile ad fraud: click fraud and static placement fraud. MAdFraud [6] and ClickDroid [15] were proposed to detect click fraud for Android apps based on networking traffic analysis. MAdFraud used techniques that analyzed the ad request pages to identify if publishers were requesting ads while the app was in the background or clicking ads without user's interaction. ClickDroid empirically evaluated click fraud security risks of eight popular ad networks. DECAF [4] was proposed to automatically detect placement fraud on Windows phone by analyzing the visual layouts of ad views, but it can not be applied to Android apps directly. Placement fraud detection on Android remains unstudied, let alone the dynamic interactive fraud. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work to study both placement fraud and dynamic interactive fraud targeting Android platform.
In this paper, we created a taxonomy of mobile ad frauds based on behavior policies of popular ad libraries [17] [18] and a manually labeled dataset of ad fraud apps. Besides static placement fraud, we also introduce a new category called dynamic interactive fraud.
1) Explicit UI Transition Fraud: Popping up an ad view during users' interaction with the app, which could lead to undesirable click. App publishers use this trick to get more accidental clicks. The policies of Google AdMob require that "Do not place interstitial ads on app load and when exiting apps as interstitials should only be placed in between pages of app content" [17] . 2) Implicit UI Transition Fraud: Different from click fraud which uses bot networks to drive fake clicks, implicit UI transition fraud triggers unsuspicious downloading behaviors (apps or files) without user's consent after user clicks the ads. Criteria for mobile ad stipulates that "The behavior that directly download apps or files without user's interaction after clicking the ad is a mandatory download" [19] . Besides, most of the downloading behaviors in implicit UI transition fraud cannot be canceled. The downloading behavior will cost user's money and greatly degrade user experience. 3) Pop-up Window Fraud: Popping up an ad view after exiting the app. The behavior policies of Google Admob regulate that ads should not be placed in the apps that are running in the background or outside of the app environment [17] . Pop-up window fraud could seriously degrades user experience because the popping up ad usually annoys mobile users in many ways. For example, it stays in the home screen and covers icons of apps which you want to click. It may show up unscheduled to harass you, and you can not end it before you find out that the ad belongs to which app. 4) Hidden Fraud: Ads are hidden behind other controls.
The behavior policies of Google Admob regulate that ads should not be placed very close to or underneath buttons or any other object which users may accidentally click while interacting with your app [17] . App publishers hide ads to give users the illusion of an "ad-free app", in order to provide a better experience without ads. But ads in hidden fraud do not play a promotional role as a normal ad do, resulting in the loss of advertisers. 5) Size Fraud: Ads are either too small or too large for users to read. Many ad networks give advices to developers about the size of different types of ads.
For example, developers that use AdMob library could implement a number of different ad formats, depending on the platform (e.g. mobile vs. tablet) [17] . The size of standard banner ad is set to 320*50 [20] . Although the ad size advice given by ad networks are not mandatory and there is no fixed value for ad size, the size ratio between the ad and the screen is in a relatively stable range so that the ad can be viewed normally by users. Most ads in size fraud are too small so that app publishers make the app an "ad-free app". The "large size" fraud can get a greater probability of attention and click, but it affects user visual experience. 6) Number Fraud: An app page displays too many ads.
DoubleClick ad program policies [18] stipulate that "Number of ads permitted to display on a page do not exceed the amount of site content". In general, more than three ads in one single state will be considered unacceptable for users. It will seriously affect the normal function of apps if the ad content exceeds the amount of the app content. 7) Overlap Fraud: Ads are overlapped with actionable views. The behavior policies of Google Admob regulate that ads should not be placed in a location that covers up or hides any area that users have interest in viewing during typical interaction [17] . App publishers use overlap fraud to trigger undesirable impressions and clicks which may annoy users. In order to detect all the seven kinds of ad fraud, we have implemented a tool called FrauDroid which combines analyzing background networking traffic and the visual layouts of ad views to automatically detect ad fraud in Android apps.
III. FRAUDROID OVERVIEW
The overall architecture of FrauDroid is shown in Figure 3 . To detect ad fraud efficiently, we first use a combined approach to identify apps that use ad libraries from massive apps. On one hand, apps that use ad libraries always need several permissions to load and display ads, including "android.permission.INTERNET" and "android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE". On the other hand, we take advantage of LibRadar [21] , an obfuscation-resilient tool to detect third-party libraries used in Android apps. For the apps that use ad libraries, FraudBot automated runs the app on smartphone and generates the UI State Transition Graph, which records the layout information and networking traffic for each UI state. The relationship between UI states and corresponding event transition information are also recorded to restore the whole app execution process. Finally, Ad View Detector identifies the UI state that contains ad views and Fraud Checker uses a set of heuristic rules to identify ad fraud by analyzing the layout information and background networking traffic of each state.
IV. GENERATING UI STATE TRANSITION GRAPH
One of the key idea behind our work is that manipulating the visual layout of ad views in a mobile app can be automated detected by traversing all the UI states. So we use the automated input generation techniques to get the UI information for ad fraud detection.
However, it is time-consuming to go through and record all the UI states of an app, which makes this method unsuitable for large-scale app analysis. In our prior experiment, it took several hours to traverse all the states of an app. Our key idea is based on the finding that more than 90% of the UI states do not contain any ad views. Thus, we propose FraudBot, an automated scalable tool to trigger the UI states of an app, especially the states that contain ad views. FraudBot takes advantage of a more sophisticate exploration strategy to preferentially choose the suspicious ad views first for detecting ad fraud. Besides, we monitor the networking traffic to help identify unsuspicious downloading behavior in background that cannot be detected based on the UI states, which could help detect the implicit UI transition fraud.
FraudBot adopts a state transition model and use ad first exploration strategy to traverse as much as UI states that contain ad views within a limited time. Figure 4 shows an example of the state transition model. Basically, It is a directed graph, in which each node represents an app state, and each edge between two nodes represents the test input event that triggers the state transition. Each state node records the networking traffic, the running process information and view tree information. Each event edge contains the details of the test input such as the event type, the view class, the source state, etc. The state transition graph is constructed on the fly. FraudBot gets the views from the current state and generates a event input based on the ad first exploration strategy. Once the app state is changed, the new state and the event are added into the graph. The UI state transition graph can restore the whole app execution process for ad fraud detection. Fig. 4 . An example of the state transition graph. Note that the data in this graph is simplified for easy understanding.
A. Ad First Exploration Strategy
We developed an Ad First Exploration Strategy in FraudBot to traverse the UI states that contain ad views considering the balance of coverage and time efficiency. Mobile users could trigger events (e.g., clicking, pressing) to interact with UI components such as button, scroll, etc. Thus FraudBot generates these events based on current state to simulate real user behaviors.
Traversing all the UI states of an app takes an average of more than one hour, which is unsuitable for scalable ad fraud detection [4] . Thus we propose an ad first exploration strategy to traverse the states that contain ad views to achieve the balance between UI coverage and time efficiency. The core idea of the strategy is that we only traverse the main UI state and the exit UI state and take priority to click ad views located in these two states. Basically, FraudBot takes a a breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm and reorders the views acquired from each state according to ad features described in Section V-A and an ad first rule. In our preliminary experiments, we found that more than 90% of the ads displayed in the main UI state and the exit UI state. Thus we set the traversal depth to 1, which means that FraudBot only explores the views in the main UI state.
FraudBot checks whether the initial state is the main UI state first. If it is a splash state (usually containing some tutorial pages) or an ad state, the strategy sends a back event or a close event to get to the main UI state of the app. Then, it gets the views of the main UI state and identifies the ad views based on the string features, type features and placement features. FraudBot prioritizes the views and ad views will be triggered first. At last, it exits the app after it clicks all the views. Considering that loading an ad view takes time, the transition time between two states is set to 5 seconds according to the average ad view loading time in our experiment network environment. By using ad first exploration strategy with traversal depth as 1, we reduce the traversing time from one hour per app to three minutes per app on average, which could effectively improve the efficiency of our approach.
B. Constructing View Tree Figure 5 shows an example of the view tree, which is detected as explicit UI transition fraud. The root is the ground layout view which contains several upper views. Each view can be treated as a node in the tree that has some basic properties such as position, size, class name, etc. Note that each parent node is a container of child nodes, and only leaf nodes can interact with users. So we only focus on leaf nodes, because only the leaf node is likely to be ad views.
The attributes information of leaf nodes could be used to identify ad views. As shown in Figure 5 , the leaf node with tag 9 has a self-developed class name "com.pop.is.ar", which is a string feature to be an ad view candidate. Besides, it has a bound value of {[135, 520], [945, 1330]} meaning that it locates in the center of the screen, and a size value of 810*810 that fits an interstitial ad size. Then it can be confirmed as an ad view combined the string features and the placement features (see Section V-A).
Besides, layout information is not enough to detect implicit UI transition fraud. Downloading behaviors cannot be identified based on the attributes of views. Our approach is based on the finding that background downloading will increase unusual networking traffic. So we monitor the networking traffic of target app at runtime. Once the networking traffic increases greatly, we will check the downloading behaviors and analyze whether it is triggered by unsuspicious app downloading.
V. AUTOMATED AD FRAUD DETECTION
FrauDroid detects ad fraud automatically by analyzing the layout information and networking traffic stored in the UI state transition graph. It consists of two key components: Ad View Detector and Fraud Checker.
A. Ad View Detector
As we mentioned earlier in this paper, it is hard to identify ad views in Android app. To differentiate the ad views from a large number of normal views in a given UI state, we manually labeled a large mount of ad views and normal views, compared them from various aspects (e.g., string features, type features, placement features, etc). Then we use a combined heuristic approach to detect ad views.
String feature. We found that lots of the ad views have specific string features in "class" field. Most ad libraries implement the ad views themselves instead of using the Android system views. Thus the ad views have self-developed class names that are different from system views such as android.widget.Button and android.widget.TextView. Besides, most developers tend to name the class of the ad views with some string hints such as "AdWebview" and "AdLayout" according to the coding style. Unfortunately, simply matching ad in the class name would lead to substantial portion of false positives as several non-ad view class names have ad in their segments which are common words (e.g., shadow, gadget, load, adapter, adobe). Thus, to work around this limitation, we collect all English words containing ad from SCOWL5 (accounting for a total of 13,385 words), and dismiss class names containing such words as potential ad views. So if the class name of the view are self-developed or if the class name has a string hint, it could be an ad view candidate.
Type feature. For apps without string features, ad views are implemented by the Android system views. We find that all the ad views in our ground truth apps belong to three types: "ImageView", "WebView" and "ViewFlipper". Thus the type information is helpful in pinpoint possible ad views.
Placement feature. In general, most of the ad views have special size and location characteristics that we called placement features. Mobile ads could be displayed in three common ways: 1) Banner ad, ad view is located in the top or bottom of the screen; 2) Interstitial ad, ad view is square and located in the center of the screen; 3) Full table screen, ad view fills the whole screen. Many ad networks specify the ad size for different types of mobile ads [17] , which could be used to identify possible ad views.
We use a combined heuristic approach to detect ad views. We first use string features to match possible self-developed ad views and type features to match possible Android system ad views, lots of ad view candidates could be identified. Then we take advantage of placement features to further confirm ad views from ad view candidates above. For known ad libraries, the ad view has relatively stable string and placement features. We have manually labeled features for popular libraries, including admob and waps. For views that do not have string features, we combine type and placement features to distinguish ad views. Although the combined type and placement features of some non-ad views are similar those of ad views, which could mislead our ad view detector, the false positives are acceptable (see Section VII-A).
B. Fraud Checker
We created a Fraud Checker based on a set of heuristic rules to detect all the seven kinds of ad fraud.
Explicit UI Transition Fraud. This type of fraud is mainly found in interstitial ad. Note that interstitial Ad is an isolated activity that covers the activity of host app, thus it is not able to get ad view and other views in a given state. Fraud Checker first traverses all the UI states. If an UI state contains interactive views (e.g., dialog or buttons) that entice users to click, the Fraud Checker will check the following UI state to analyze whether an ad view exists. Specifically, Fraud Checker tries to identify the state transition information by checking the transition graph. Fraud Checker detects the UI state as explicit UI transition fraud if an interstitial ad is placed on top of interactive views.
Implicit UI Transition Fraud. The implicit UI transition fraud will trigger unsuspicious downloading behaviors (apps or files) without user's interaction once clicking on ads. Any UI state that meets the following rules will be identified as implicit UI transition fraud: 1) there are ad views in this state; 2) there is a downloading behavior; and 3) the following state does not have any interactive interface and still belongs to the same activity, and 4) the state is triggered by a touch event. Thus, we monitor the networking traffic at runtime, once the networking traffic increases greatly, we will check whether the behavior is triggered by unsuspicious app downloading. In our experiment, we find the networking traffic speed of downloading behavior is generally higher than 150KB/s, which is much higher than that of loading ads or other network behaviors. So if the networking traffic speed increases greatly and exceeds 150KB/S, we will think the tough event triggered a downloading behavior.
Pop-up Window Fraud. Ads should not be placed in apps that are running in the background of the device or outside of the app environment. Fraud Checker will get the list of activity names that belongs to the app first. Then it scans all the UI states, if the activity name of a state is not in the list and there are ad views in this state, Fraud Checker will identify this state as Pop-up window fraud.
Hidden Fraud. Fraud Checker detects an UI state as hidden fraud if the ad view in the given UI state is (partially) covered by non-ad views. In detail, Fraud Checker uses the size and location information to analyze whether ad views overlap with other non-ad views. The hierarchical relationship between the views (more specifically, the z-coordinates of the views) could be used to determine whether an ad view is hidden.
Size Fraud. Many ad networks specify the ad size as advice for different types of ad views [17] [20] . Although the ad size varies according to the screen size, the size ratio between ad view and the screen is relatively stable. We define the size ratio as the value of the ad view area divided by the screen area and use the size ratio as the criteria to figure out thresholds for different types of ad views based on extensive experiments. We set the size ratio as 0.005 for the banner ad, 0.2 for the interstitial ad and 1 for the full table screen ad. The banner ad view is usually located on top or bottom of the screen, while the interstitial or full table screen ad views are usually located in the center of the screen. Combining location information and size information for a given ad view, Fraud Checker will check whether the size ratio violates the regulation.
Number Fraud. For each UI state, Fraud Checker will check the number of ad views and the size of each ad views. Note that although there are no strict regulation of the number of ad views, some ad network behavior policies required that "the number of ads permitted to not exceed the amount of site content" [18] . More specifically, Fraud Checker will analyze whether the total display area of the ad views occupied more than 50% of the screen area.
Overlap Fraud. In contrast to hidden fraud, a state is identified as overlap fraud if some ad views are placed on top of other views. Thus overlap fraud detection is similar to hidden fraud. Size and location information are used to identify whether the views are overlapped.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
FrauDroid is implemented in Python, with more than 3,000 lines of code. Our experiment is running on a Nexus 5 smartphone with LineageOS [22] system instead of emulators, because some ad libraries refuse to display ads when it detects the app is running in an emulator environment.
FraudBot is based on DroidBot [23] , a lightweight UIguided test input generator, which is able to interact with an Android app on almost any device without instrumentation. It can generate UI-guided test inputs based on a state transition model generated on-the-fly, and allow users to integrate their own strategies or algorithms. We integrate the ad first exploration strategy for a high efficiency of ad fraud detection.
We take advantage of Hierarchy Viewer [24] to understand the layout and obtain exhaustive information from each UI view such as name, size and class name. Based on the comprehensive information from hierarchy viewer, we can easily build a view tree that can accurate describe current state.
VII. EVALUATION
We first apply FrauDroid to a labeled dataset to measure the accuracy and performance. Note that we evaluate Ad View Detector and Fraud Checker separately. Then we apply FrauDroid to a large set of apps to study the prevalence of ad fraud in major Android app markets.
A. Ad View Detector
We first measure the accuracy of Ad View Detector. We randomly choose 500 popular apps from Google Play. Then, we use FraudBot to get UI view trees for each app (200 seconds per app on average), and we get 4,257 states for the 500 apps. Ad View Detector analyzes each UI state to identify ad views. We manually examined all the 4,257 states to label the ground truth.
As shown in Table I , Ad View Detector identified 225 states that contain ad views, among which 49 states are false positives, achieving a detection precision of 78.2%. Besides, 24 states that contain ad views were not detected, the recall rate reaches 88%. The result suggests that our detector combining string features and placement features has the ability to identify ad views with a high recall rate and an acceptable precision rate.
What caused false positives and false negatives? The main reason leading to false positives is that some states have no string features, and we can only use type features and 
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Hidden Size Number Overlap  5  33  2  2  3  2  2   TABLE III  THE EXPERIMENT RESULT OF FRAUD CHECKER. Ad fraud (prediction) W/O Ad fraud (prediction) Ad fraud TP(45) FN(2) W/O Ad fraud FP (7) TN (34) placement features to distinguish ad views from non-ad views. However, the type features and placement features of some non-ad views are similar to those of ad views, which could mislead our ad view detector. The cause of false negatives is that FraudBot fails to get some attributes of the ad view in a few cases. Then the attributes are set to a default value (e.g., 0*0 for size) that may be regarded as exception by Ad View Detector. The 24 false negative states have some exception information (e.g. size, location) recorded by FraudBot and Ad View Detector fails to identify them.
B. Fraud Checker
To evaluate the performance of Fraud Checker, we manually labeled a dataset of 47 apps which contains at least one instance for each type of ad fraud. The distribution of this labeled dataset is shown in Table II . Note that there may be multiple types of fraud in an app, for example, two apps (anzhi.fighttrain and az360.gba.jqrgsseed) were found containing both explicit UI transition fraud and implicit UI transition fraud. We also labeled 41 apps that contain normal ads as comparison.
As shown in Table III , Fraud Checker achieves high accuracy with a precision rate of 86.5% and a recall rate of 95.7%.
Among the seven false positive apps, three of them are misclassified as pop-up window fraud, three of them are misclassified as overlap fraud, and the one is misclassified as implicit UI transition fraud. The main reason leading to false positives is that some ad views cannot be detected correctly, 6 of the 7 false positive apps are incurred by inaccurate ad view detection. Besides, one app is misclassified as implicit UI transition fraud, because it loads a large image in the ad view, which leads to a high networking traffic speed that exceeds 150KB/S. Two apps bypassed the detection of Fraud Checker, including one pop-up window fraud app and one overlap fraud app. By analyzing the results, we find that the size of ad view is 350*0, which should be 350*50 as a banner ad size. FraudBot can not get the hight of the view, causing Ad View Detector to fail to identify the ad view through the placement features.
C. Performance Evaluation
Then we analyzed the performance of FrauDroid from two aspects: (1) generating UI transition graph and (2) checking ad fraud. For different app size scale (100KB, 1MB, 10MB, 50MB and 100MB), we choose 500 popular apps (in total 2500 apps) and then analyze the time cost and memory cost at runtime. Note that we do not consider the cost of ad library detection because our tool is based on LibRadar to detect ad libraries and the performance of LibRadar has been detailed analyzed in previous work [21] [25] .
As shown in Figure 6 , the time cost and memory cost of FraudBot grow linearly with the app size increasing, while the Fraud Checker is independent of app size. The reason is that, large apps usually have more activities and states that need to be loaded and traversed by FraudBot, while the performance of Fraud Checker is mainly relying on UI transition graph, which is not directly relevant to app size. The average time cost of FraudBot is much higher than that of Fraud Checker (216.774 s vs 0.402 s) and both have a low memory cost at about 20 MB. Thus the performance of FrauDroid is mainly determined by FraudBot.
VIII. A STUDY OF AD FRAUD IN MAJOR APP MARKETS
In this section, we study the prevalence of ad fraud in a large scale of apps from 21 major Android stores. We collected 80,539 Android apps, including 28,126 apps from Google Play and 52,413 apps from third-party app markets, as shown in Table IV . These apps are downloaded between February 18, 2017 and Mar 19, 2017 . Take the advantage of LibRadar [21] , we could identify 9,940 apps from Google Play and 21,353 apps from third-party app markets that use ad libraries.
A. Overall Result
As shown in Table IV , FrauDroid has identified 92 ad fraud apps (account for 0.29% of apps that use ad libraries in our dataset), including 5 of them from Google Play and 87 of them from third-party markets. On average, 0.05% of the apps that use ad libraries in Google Play are ad fraud apps, while 2.65% of the apps that use ad libraries in PP Assistant market are ad fraud apps. These apps exist in various categories, especially in games and tools. Most of them are still available in the app markets with a lots of downloads. For example, an audio player app named love ringtones 2 has 160000 of downloads in Baidu Mobile Assistant and it is marked as safe, which means that the market may pay little attention to ad frauds.
B. Ad Fraud Distribution by Type
For the 92 ad fraud apps, the distribution of different ad fraud type is shown in Table V . More than 90% of ad frauds belong to dynamic interactive fraud, which has never been explored by previous studies. Implicit UI transition fraud and explicit UI transition fraud took up for a large part. Static placement fraud only occupied a small portion of fraud apps. One possible reason is that dynamic interactive frauds are more difficult to detect and easier to mislead users to trigger ad impressions and clicks, so developers and publishers tend to use more sophisticated techniques and tricks to cheat and get more benefits.
C. Ad fraud Distribution by Ad Networks
We also explored the prevalence of ad fraud in different ad networks. The 92 ad fraud apps are distributed across The result suggests that ad fraud is prevalent in ad networks. Admob and Waps are two of the most popular ad libraries, it stands to reason that they attracted the most number of ad fraud apps. Although Google Admob has released strict restriction [17] on how ad views should be placed to avoid ad fraud, we still found 14 ad fraud apps that use Admob ad library. The most popular one is Spider Man Total Mayhem HD 3 , with 6.2 million of downloads in 360 Mobile Assistant and we find a lot of implicit UI transition fraud complaints in the comments section.
We could learn from the result that ad frauds distribute in most markets and ad networks, it is threatening the mobile advertising ecosystem and should be paid more attentions. Most ad fraud apps could be classified as grayware, for the reason that they contain annoying, undesirable or undisclosed behaviors that cannot be classified as malware [26] . These gray behaviors do not cause direct loss to stakeholders, thus they do not attract as much attention as malwares do.
We also find that only some famous ad networks have released privacy policies on how to use ad libraries, most ad networks do not publish any policies. Thus it is necessary for all the ad networks to regulate the gray behaviors of app developers. Besides, app markets should make efforts to detect and remove ad fraud apps. Figure 7 shows case studies of the seven types of ad fraud apps we detected from Google Play and third-party app markets. Fig. 7 (1) shows an example of explicit UI transition fraud (app: com.android.yatree.taijiaomusic). The ad view pops up above the exit dialog, causing undesirable click on the ad instead of the exit button. This app misleads 9 of 10 users to click the ad view in our study. Fig. 7 (2) shows an example of pop-up window fraud (app: com.natsume.stone.android). The ad view was displayed on the home screen even if the mobile users exited the app. Fig. 7 (3) shows an example of implicit 3 http://zhushou.360.cn/detail/index/soft id/16640 UI transition fraud (app: com.hongap.slider). When users click the ad view shown on the left screenshot, the app starts to download directly without user's interaction. Fig. 7 (4) shows an example of hidden fraud (app: forest.best.livewallpaper). The ad view is hidden behind the Email button. Fig. 7 (5) shows an example of size fraud (app: com.dodur.android.golf ). The ad view on the right side of the screenshot is too small for user to read. Fig. 7 (6) shows an example of number fraud (app: com.maomao.androidcrack). There are a total number of 3 ad views placed on top of the page, which exceeds the amount of site content. Fig. 7 (7) shows an example of overlap fraud (app: com.sysapk.wifibooster). The ad view was placed on top of four buttons of the host app.
D. Case Study
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss possible limitations of our approach and discuss potential future improvements.
Ad view detection. We use a heuristic approach which combines string features and placement features to identify ad views. However, some apps are fully obfuscated, making it is hard to extract meaningful string features. Only placement features can be used to identify ad views in this case. Thus one future work is to develop an obfuscation-resilient and more accurate approach to identify ad views.
Ad state coverage. More than 90% ads are displayed in main UI state and exit UI state in our experiment. Thus we optimize our UI exploration strategy to achieve a balance between performance and UI coverage. It is quite possible that FraudBot with traversal depth as one cannot traverse all the possible UI states that contain ad views, so we could expand the ad state coverage by setting a larger traversal depth.
Other types of ad fraud. Our work is the first to identify "dynamic interactive fraud" and we have built a tool to automated detect all the seven types of ad fraud in Android apps. However, there may be other types of ad fraud in mobile apps, so we could extend FrauDroid to detect other new types of fraud in the future. After a manual audit and code review of 92 ad fraud apps, we find that the developers have the main incentive for conducting ad fraud. All of the ad fraud behaviors are caused by the misuse or improper use of the ad libraries provided by ad networks. Although we do not find ad libraries directly involved in ad fraud, but we can not exclude a small number of ad libraries is the possibility of conducting ad fraud.
X. RELATED WORK
FrauDroid is inspired by two lines of related work.
A. Ad Fraud Detection
Ad fraud in web advertising has been extensively studied. Most of them focus on click fraud, including detecting click fraud based on networking traffic [8] [9] or search engine query logs [10] , characterizing click fraud [11] [12] [13] and analyzing its profit model [14] . Existing studies on mobile ad fraud mainly focus on click fraud and static placement fraud. Crussell et al. [6] developed a novel approach for automatically identifying click fraud in three steps: building HTTP request trees, identifying ad request pages using machine learning, and detecting clicks in HTTP request trees using heuristic rules. Liu et al. [4] investigated static placement frauds on Windows Phone by analyzing the layouts of apps. Their approach used automated app navigation, together with optimizations to scan through a large number of visual views and then a set of rules to detect whether ad fraud exists. However, with the evolution of ad fraud, new types of ad fraud become prevalent and they cannot be handled by stateof-the-art approaches. We introduce a new category called dynamic interactive fraud and design an automation ad fraud detection tool to detect both dynamic interactive fraud and static placement fraud in Android apps.
B. App Automation
Several Android automation framework such as Hierarchy Viewer [24] , UIAutomator [27] and Robotium [28] are provided by Android platform for app testing. But these tools rely on developer to provide automation scripts and are not suitable for most scenarios such as compatibility testing and malware analysis [4] .
Thus a great deal of research has been performed on full app automation, especially on the automated test input generation for Android [29] . As Android apps are eventdriven, these testing tools can generate event inputs following different strategies, including random, model-based and systematic exploration strategy. Monkey [30] , Dynodroid [31] , Intent Fuzzer [32] and DroidFuzzer [33] are proposed to employ a random strategy. They are mainly used for stress testing. However, a random strategy would hardly be able to generate highly specific inputs. Moreover, these tools are not aware of how much behavior of the app under test has been already covered, and thus are likely to generate redundant events that do not help the exploration. So random strategy tools are not suitable for ad fraud detection. Model-based strategy tools [34] (e.g., GUIRipper [35] , MobiGUITAR [36] , A3E [37] , SwiftHand [38] , PUMA [39] , etc.) build a GUI model of the app and use it to generate events and systematically explore the behavior of the app. Most of them use finite state machines as model and activities as states and events as transitions, and then implement a DFS or BFS strategy to explore the states for a more effective results in terms of code coverage. Systematic strategy tools [40] [41] use more sophisticated techniques such as symbolic execution and evolutionary algorithms to guide the exploration towards code that can only be revealed upon specific inputs. However, most of them need to either instrument the system or the app, thus cannot be directly used to detect ad fraud. Our work is implemented based on DroidBot [23] , a lightweight UI-guided test input generator, which is able to interact with Android apps without instrumentation. It allows users to integrate their own strategies for different scenarios which make it possible to detect ad fraud. We improved DroidBot and implemented a more sophisticate ad view exploration strategy for automated scalable ad fraud detection.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an explorative study of ad fraud in Android apps. We first create a taxonomy of existing mobile ad frauds. Besides static placement fraud, we also created a new category called dynamic interactive fraud that has never been explored by previous work. Then we propose FrauDroid, a new approach to detect ad frauds based on UI transition graph and networking traffic. Based on extensive experiments on smartphones, we have identified 92 ad fraud apps, roughly accounted for 0.3% of the apps that use ad libraries in our study. The result suggests that ad fraud is threatening the mobile advertising ecosystem and should be paid more attentions.
